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ROBERT M. HUNTERt
The recent years have echoed with the challenges of estab-
lished institutions. Particularly in connection with the adminis-
tration of justice has this been true. Witness the Wickersham
Commission's Report on Lawlessness in Law Enforcement and
the widespread agitation for improvement in Criminal Law Ad-
ministration;' the poll of the Ohio State Bar Association con-
cerning the selection of judges,' the proposed small claims
Division of Common Pleas Court to supersede the justice of the
peace,' the recently enacted simplified Appellate Procedure
Act.' The civil jury has not escaped its fair share of criticism
and discussion.' Opinions regarding it have run the gamut from
the encomium of the Fourth of July orator to the condemnation
of the legal reformer who will have none of it. One writer says,
"I consider the jury, not as it was seven hundred years ago, but
* A talk given at the Reunion of the Alumni of the Ohio State University,
College of Law.
f Associate Professor of Law, Ohio State University.
1 See the program of the Cincinnati Conference on Criminal Law Ad-
ministration in OHIO BAR, Vol. VIII, No. 33, P. 411 (Nov. I 1, 1935).
2 OHIO BAR, Vol. VIII, No. II, p. 127 (June io, 1935). See also the
tentative draft of a constitutional amendment for appointive judges, OHIo BAR,
Vol. VIII. No. 25, p. 311 (Sept. 16, 1935).
3 OHIO BAR, Vol. VII, No. 4z, p. 566 (June 14, 1935).
4 G.C. 12223-1 to 12223-49 and numerous other sections, x16 O.L.
104. Effective Jan. I, 1936.
In an article by Clark and Shulman "Jury Trial in Civil Cases-A
Study in Judicial Administration," 43 YALE L.J. 867 n. I, the following re-
cent discussions are cited: Lummus, Civil Juries and the Law's Delay (932)
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as it is today. We have fostered and improved upon the original
conception of our ancestors centuries ago, until it has reached
the form in which it now exists-an instrument for the decision
of facts nowhere rivaled, in the field of the legal tribunal, for
its impartiality independence and satisfaction to the great body
of our citizenry."6 Another tells us that the jury "is about as
well fitted to the needs of modern society as a smooth bore
musket to those of a modern marine."'
When the warfare on the jury front had quieted down to
desultory sniping a barrage was let loose in the form of Mr.
Jerome Frank's book, "Law and the Modern Mind."' A single
chapter was devoted to the jury but that chapter was quite
devastating.9 Since then Mr. Frank has trained his guns on
other institutions and has dropped a couple of shells on the law
schools."0 The writer was sufficiently jarred by these blasts that
he was quite receptive to the suggestion of a colleague1' that a
study be made of civil juries in Franklin County. One of the
matters on which it was hoped that some light might be shed
17 MASS. L.Q. (No. 4) 34 (932), iz B.U.L. REv.. 487; Wilkin, The Jury:
Reformation, Not Abolition (1930) 13 J. Am. JtUD. Soc. I54; Duane, Civil
Jury Should be Abolished (1928) 12 id. 137; Wigmore, A Program for the
Trial of Jury Trial (1928) 12 id. 166; Corbin, The Jury on Trial (1928)
14 A.B.A.J. 507; Sweet, The Jury on Trial: A Reply (1929) 15 id 241;
Proskauer, A New Professional Psychology Essential for Law Reform (1928)
14 id. 121, 13 MAss. L.Q. (No. 5) 2; Green, Why Trial by Jury? (1928)
15 AM. MERCURY 316; Elder, Trial by Jury: Is It Passing? (1928) 156
HARPER'S 570; Duane and Windolph, Should the Civil Jury be Abolished?
(A Debate) (1928) 8o FoRUM 489, 498. Cf. Peterson v. Fargo-Moorhead
St. Ry. Co., 37 N.D. 440, 16o N.W. 42 (1917); Ethridge, J., dissenting in
Talbot & Higgins Lumber Co. v. McLeod Lumber Co., 147 Miss. 186, 192,
113 So. 433, 4:34 (1927).
6 Corbin, "The Jury on Trial," 14 A.B.A.J. 507, 516 (1928).
7 Sweet, "The Jury on Trial: A Reply," 15 A.B.A.J. 241, 243 (1929).
8 Brentano's Publishers, New York, i93o.
9 Chapter XVI "The Basic Myth and the Jury."
10 See Frank "Are Judges Human?" 8o U. PA. L.R. 17; 233 (193);
"What Courts Do in Fact" 26 ILL. L.R. 645; 761 (1932); "What Consti-
tutes a Good Legal Education" 19 A.B.A.J. 723 (I933). "Mr. Justice
Holmes and Non-Euclidean Legal Thinking" (1932) 17 CORN. L.Q. 568.
" Prof. Silas A. Harris. This study was not only his idea but in carrying
it out he did the major portion of the work. It happened to fall to the
writer's lot to tell about it.
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was that of the effect of knowledge of insurance in automobile
accident cases. The case of Pavilonis v. Valentine12 at the time
represented the last word of the Supreme Court on the question
of the voir due examination relative to insurance. The holding
in the case was such as to permit prospective jurors to be asked
as to their connection with, interest in, or relationship to a cas-
ualty insurance company interested in the outcome of the case.
Judge Robinson in the majority opinion stated that, "It is a
matter of common knowledge that automobile owners rather
generally carry casualty insurance, and that jurors rather gen-
erally own automobiles, and, that counsel and representatives
of the casualty insurance companies do not generally appear at
the trial and conduct the defense of suits in which they are not
interested."' 3
Chief Justice Marshall quoted this statement in his dissent-
ing opinion and remarked that "This is an assumption of fact
which is contrary to well authenticated statistics on that subject.
In 1925 (this case was decided in 1929), when there were
1,400,ooo automobiles in this state, statistics show that only
14% of them were covered by indemnity insurance, while 86%
were uninsured."'" This quotation of statistics appeared to be
a rather appropriate answer to the assumption of the majority.
The dissenting opinion also sets forth constructive suggestions
for means of meeting the problem. The following statement,
however, was one which raised a question. "The fact that such
methods (indicating the background presence of an insurance
company) are resorted to by counsel for the plaintiff, and that
they are so stoutly resisted by counsel for the defendant, is
proof sufficient that the experiences of the past have shown that
verdicts are facilitated and the amount of recovery augmented
by such means.""
With the great amount of controversy that has arisen con-
cerning this matter of keeping the jury uninformed as to de-
12x12O O.S. 154 (I9z9). I65 N.E. 730. 14 Id. p. 172.
13 Id. p. 159. 15 Id. p. 164.
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fendant's insurance," we were interested in trying to find out
in a few cases how important a consideration it actually was.
While we were about it we decided to study some other phases
of the jury system of trying cases as well. Our first problem
was to get ourselves in a position where we could talk to jurors
with some assurance that we were getting a fair measure of the
truth. This problem proved surprisingly simple. The three
judges of the Franklin County Common Pleas Court17 who
happened to be sitting in the civil jury rooms were most oblig-
ing in their cooperation with us. Without their cooperation we
could not have procured information from many of the jurors.
Our method of procedure was as follows. In each case one or
both of us sat through the trial from the impaneling of the jury
till the final charge and giving the case to the jury. This meant
that for the better part of three months we haunted the Court
House during the week day hours when we were not required
to be on the campus with our classes. While there are times
when this is an interesting diversion, it is not to be recommended
to any one as a life work. Trying a case on the part of a lawyer
and hearing it on the part of the judge has its compensations,
but to sit day after day as a more or less passive bleacherite soon
loses its charm. We generally did our hunting in pairs and
when the jury had returned its verdict and had been discharged
we were hot on the trail. We went armed with a letter signed
by the judge who had presided in that case and which explained
the purpose of our study, and suggested to the jurors that they
might feel free to tell us as much as they cared to about their
deliberations and what took place. 8 In interviewing over a
hundred of the jurors in about 25 different cases there was only
one instance when we had the slightest difficulty in getting the
16 See exhaustive annotations, 56 A.L.R. 1418, and 74 A.L.R. 849.
17 Judges John R. King, Charles A. Leach, and Henry L. Scarlett.
18 In Ohio, petit jurors take no oath of secrecy and there is no rule of
law which prevents them from discussing freely with anyone the pr'ceedings
in the jury room. While it is common for jurors to discuss a case with the
lawyers and judges, it seems possible that something less than the whole truth
may be told, in the interest of tact and diplomacy.
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jurors to answer our questions. In that case the man, a not too
intelligent Irishman, would have opened up for us, as we sat
with him on the porch, if his mother had not stood in the door-
way like the counsel for the accused and warned him that he
"shouldn't say a thing." The old lady said she knew what we
were up to, that her brother used to work in the Court House
and that she was on to the likes of us. With this single exception
the judge's letter was an open sesame and I feel that we were
given a fair and honest description of what took place in the
determination of every case.
One of the first questions which we would ask was concern-
ing the selection of the foreman. This and other features of the
actual mechanics of rendering a verdict seem to be taken so
much for granted that there is a rather amusing hit or miss,
happy-go-lucky lack of system about the whole thing. Most
of the persons called for jury service during our term of study
were novices. Because of their feeling of combined responsi-
bility and bewilderment about the mystical processes into which
they were being initiated, one who had previously been on a
jury was almost certain to be acclaimed as the fountain head of
wisdom and the logical person to be selected as foreman. That
the experience that set him apart and made him appear to be of
different clay was quite commonplace never seemed to suggest
itself to the others in the first case. In the next and later cases
the former foreman was reduced to mortal size and the nimbus
which had surrounded him before was recognized as the reflec-
tion of the inexperience and naivete of the neophytes rather
than any attribute of his own. In several of the cases so great
was the devaluation of the office of foreman after the first ex-
perience that a person was chosen because he came into the jury
room after the others or because he happened to sit down in a
chair away from the circle around the room. In one case a
rather dominant individual nominated as foreman an old gentle-
man, who was almost deaf, and then proceeded to conduct the
meeting for him.
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A question which might be expected at this point is "what
difference does it make who is chosen foreman, or how he is
chosen?" It seems possible that it is of some importance who is
chosen and how. We found it to be a common thing for the
foreman as soon as he was selected to proceed to demonstrate
his capacity for quick action. In a number of cases the first thing
he would do was to take a vote as to whether the defendant was
liable. This sometimes took the form of balloting or whether
defendant was "guilty."' 9 If the vote was against the defendant
a considerable amount of time would usually be spent in arriv-
ing at an agreement as to, the amount of damages that he
should pay.
Again it might be asked, "Isn't that the most expeditious
way of getting the result?" It is expeditious and is one way of
arriving at a result, but it does such violence to the whole theory
of trials that one cannot help wondering as to its justification.
It is true that the power is given to a jury, when a general ver-
dict is returned without special findings of fact, to resolve the
one issue of defendant's liability and the extent of it, if any.2"
But surely it is the contemplation of lawyers and the judge that
some attempt be made by the jurors to break the case up into its
component parts and to settle each issue by itself.
For instance in one of the cases the issues which the lawyers
and the judge could see were several. A young man employed
by a corporation was driving an automobile belonging to it, in
the south end of the city. At an intersection he collided with
another automobile driven by another young man employed by
another corporation. Both were injured so seriously that their
first opportunity to speak to each other was in the operating
19 In his book "Judge and Jury," p. 398, Dean Leon Green tells of a
jury in a New Mexico case, in which the plaintiff sought to recover damages
for money taken from him by force. The jury returned this verdict: "We
the jury, find for the plaintiff in the sum of ten thousand five hundred dol-
lars, less one hundred and ten dollars, and sentence each of the defendants to
five years in the penitentiary, and recommend the mercy of the court."
20 For an excellent discussion of the development of this concept se
Farley, "Instructions to Juries-Their R61e in the Judicial Process," 42 YALE
L.J. 194 (1932)-
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room of a hospital where each admitted to the other that he
didn't know how the accident had happened. The first young
man, whom we shall call A, had sued the corporation which
was the employer of the other young man, B. That claim was
settled out of court and the case which we heard was B's suit
against A's employer. At the time of the collision, A was on his
way to a city market to solicit business for his employer. He had
previously driven to the 5- and io-cent store and purchased
supplies for his little daughter's birthday party. A question was
raised as to whether at the time of the accident he was acting
in the course of his employment or whether he was off on a
"frolic of his own." The issue of agency was so clearly raised
in the minds of the lawyers and the judge, that, after plaintiff's
evidence, the jury was given a considerable vacation while the
legal minds wrestled with that problem. The judge found it
so difficult of solution that he returned to the court house in
the evening and searched the books for further light on it. His
efforts were rewarded by the discovery of an opinion by an
appellate court which convinced him that he should overrule
the motion for directed verdict and permit the jury to determine
the issue of agency.
Naturally with such a situation as has been indicated the
issue of contributory negligence was very definitely in the case.
It is scarcely probable that plaintiff's employer or its insurance
company, would have paid a claim of several thousand dollars,
if there had not been considerable evidence of his negligence.
Therefore it was clear to the lawyers on both sides and to the
judge that the task of the jury was to consider each of these
issues-not only the negligence of the defendant's employee
but the question of whether he was acting for his employer, and
the question of the contributory negligence of the plaintiff. The
judge covered these matters in his charge fully and carefully,
and was explicit in placing upon the jury the responsibility for
resolving these issues in favor of the one party or the other.
What happened in the jury room?
8 LAW JOURNAL -DECEMBER, 1935
The question of the negligence of defendant's employee
was raised, briefly discussed and decided against defendant. A
considerable discussion was had as to the permanency of plain-
tiff's injury and the amount of damages to which he was en-
titled. Agreement was reached and the verdict signed and
returned to court without the question of agency and contribu-
tory negligence having been considered at all. A motion for
new trial was subsequently sustained because the judge felt that
he had committed error in allowing the jury to determine the
question of agency.
Undoubtedly the most important consideration in the minds
of the jurors and that which prompted them to disregard com-
plicated issues of law and go directly to the matter of awarding
plaintiff damages, was something which occurred long after the
accident and which therefore in the eyes of the law could have
no bearing on the cold legal question of liability. The jurors
believed that one of the counsel for defendant had dealt un-
fairly with plaintiff in getting him to come to his office and to
make out and sign a written statement concerning the accident,
without advising him that the counsel was at the time represent-
ing the other party.
There is a story of a naughty little boy who was kept after
school. The teacher got right down to brass tacks, and delivered
an appeal to his better nature which, she was convinced, was
really getting across. His attention was so rapt that she was
reluctant to break the spell of her words by pausing for breath.
And when she did the boy broke out with the delighted ex-
clamation, "Gee! Miss Smith, its your lower jaw that moves
when you talk, ain't it?"
One wonders if it is not probable that lawyers and judges
do a great deal of moving of their lower jaws, which to a greater
or less degree, fascinates the jurors for whose benefit it is done,
but adds little if anything to the sum total of human intelli-
gence. If we would be a little more candid and objective we
could see why this is almost necessarily the case. The twelve
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good men and true, who theoretically absorb the instructions
given them by the judge are not particularly apt. The drug-
gist's wife and the farmer, the policeman's wife and the un-
employed carpenter have one thing in common. None of them
has ever seen the inside of a law book. The judge comes as
teacher to this group of not too ambitious pupils, toward the
end of a long day of listening to meaningless wrangles, inter-
spersed with fairly intelligible questions and answers of wit-
nesses and immediately following what may have been a nerve
racking appeal to their emotions by one or more counsel.
In our classes in law school we endeavor to get a setting
that is somewhat conducive towards the uninterrupted play of
intellect upon intellect. To accomplish this we have thought-
fully placed the classrooms so that every other word is not
drowned out by the clanging of passing street cars and honking
taxicabs. We have been quite successful in eliminating ihe mere
spectator and hanger on, so that those for whom the instruction
is intended will not forget their role as instructees and become
engrossed in the conduct of others. We have purposely re-
frained from equipping the classrooms with clocks because of
the fundamental principle of human behavior that absorption
in the movement of the hands of a clock, prevents absorption of
anything else. Most important of all we have so arranged it
that we have placed before us for instruction young men and
young women who are hand-picked for the purpose. They come
to us before their thought processes have become crystallized
and unyielding. They are college graduates or have had two
or three years of college training. They have a real and intense
interest in the field of law and in the particular subjects in
which they receive instruction.
Taking all this together the task of the law teacher would
seem to be a simple one. And yet after every examination it is
brought home to a teacher that it is an extremely difficult job
to get across to law students the abstractions that go to make
up the law.
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It is hoped that in thus sketching the portrait of the law
student and the classroom, the contrast with the average juror
and the courtroom in which he goes to school has been made
sufficiently clear. It is possible that a common pleas judge would
find it difficult under the conditions which surround the giving
of his charge, to get it across in a way that would show its ef-
fect, if he were addressing it to a group of selected law students.
Furthermore, under conditions such as prevail in a classroom it
may be doubted if the net result of the judge's charge upon the
intellects of the picked jurors hearing it, would be a simplifica-
tion and aid in the solution of the problem before the jury.
This is said with the greatest respect for judges but with con-
siderably less respect for many of the abstractions with which
they deal, than one may have had as a law student.
Let us consider, for a moment the typical charge on the
question of negligence. It is addressed to a jury of laymen none
of whom has even been a party to a negligence action. If he
had he would probably be eliminated by challenge. None of
them knows anything about the law of torts and few have ever
been inside a courtroom except possibly to listen to a divorce
case or something of that sort. To such laymen the legal con-
cept of negligence has very little significance except as it may
be made clear by the court's charge. Negligence has been de-
fined a great many times in such charges and the definition has
probably never varied to any considerable extent from this
language. "Negligence is the failure to exercise ordinary care.
Ordinary care is that degree of care which a person of ordinary
prudence or care would exercise under the same or similar cir-
cumstances."" Let the reader place himself in the position of a
housewife or plumber or farmer serving on a jury and imagine
how much he would be helped by a definition like that. "Negli-
gence is the failure to use ordinary care. Ordinary care is ordi-
nary care." Who is this person of ordinary care who is set up
as the standard of human conduct? Manifestly it is each indi-
2 1 See L. S. Elec. Ry. Co. v. Shepherd, 48 0. App. 167, 173 (1933).
192 N.E. 740.
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vidual juror. If the charge has any effect whatever it will have
some such effect as this. While the judge goes right ahead
reading from the books or the transcripts of former charges, the
juror sets up the man of ordinary care in his own image and
backs off to see how he would act under the same or similar
circumstances." The timid old lady who has never driven an
automobile sets up as her man of ordinary care the driver of a
Model T Ford, who stops at every intersection and drives at 1o
miles an hour down the middle of the road, so that there is no
danger of his running off the road on either side. Those who
have driven automobiles will have entirely different standards.
The net result of the court's charge on the subject of negligence
is necessarily a direction to the twelve jurors to take their pre-
conceptions and long-standing convictions on the subject of
automobile driving into the jury room and come out with a
verdict that represents the best judgment of at least nine of
the twelve.
But to come back to the subject of the selection of the fore-
man. Under the conditions as we observed them there was an
utter lack of system and method in selection and also lack of
knowledge on the part of the one selected such as would enable
him to conduct the deliberations in a manner which would indi-
cate some understanding of the issues actually raised by the
evidence. It may be an unsound suggestion, but it would be
interesting to try the experiment of the selection by the judge of
the foreman of the jury. This could be done on the basis of the
voir due examination and the general impression of intelligence
and ability to command respect and attention. It could be made
possible for the judge in the presence of counsel to instruct the
foreman and answer his questions concerning the judge's writ-
ten charge which would be taken by the foreman into the jury
room.2" To any criticism of such a method that it gives the
22 See Farley op. cit. n. I8, p. 209.
23 The law now makes provision for a written charge if requested. See
G.C. I 1420-I. Such request was not made in any of the cases included in
this study and in no case was the court's charge taken to the jury room.
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judge too great a control over the jury's deliberations and de-
stroys much of the democratic character of jury trials it may be
answered: (i) There is something of a precedent in the statu-
tory method of selection of the foreman of the grand jury by
the judge 24 (2) One hesitates to believe that our common pleas
judges are not worthy of being intrusted with this degree of
control over a jury's deliberations; (3) In a much less efficient
and more cumbersome way we lodge such control in the trial
and appellate judges with the power of directing verdicts,2" and
of granting a new trial."
In one of our cases a truck loaded with lumber had broken
down on the National Road east of Columbus. The driver had
left it parked on the highway without a light and the plaintiff
had come up behind it in his automobile and collided with the
parked truck. The issue of contributory negligence was defin-
itely in the case and the defendant's counsel requested that a
written instruction be read on the subject. This was done and
the instruction was taken to the jury room with the pleadings
and exhibits. The instruction contained the usual language in
such a charge, but the word "directly" had been written in with
pen and ink before the words "contributed," so that it read that
the plaintiff could not recover "if he was guilty of negligence
which directly contributed in the slightest degree to the acci-
dent." This jury, contrary to the practice of many of the others,
actually read the special instruction in the jury room. A contro-
versy arose as to its meaning. Some of the jurors argued that
the word "directly" meant intentionally, and they contended
that plaintiff did not intentionally drive into the truck. The
24 G.C. 13436-3. "When a grand jury is impaneled in the manner pro-
vided by law, the court shall appoint one of the members thereof, as foreman,
and shall administer, or cause to be administered, to said juror an oath in the
following words. * * *"
25 With the abrogation of the "scintilla rule" and the substitution of the
"reasonable mind" test in Hamden Lodge v. Ohio Fuel Gas Co. 127 O.S.
469, 189 N.E. 246 0934) the power of the trial judge has been increased.
26 See Farley, opus cited supra n. 18 for a discussion of the control of
the jury and trial court by the appellate court. See also Green, opus cited supra
n. 17, ch. 14. "Jury Trial and the Appellate Courts."
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vote on this issue was 7 to 5. The minority could not be con-
vinced, and it was agreed that they ought to return to the court-
room and let the judge explain what the instruction meant. The
judge guided by the statutory provision 263 that a written in-
struction once given must not be orally qualified, modified or
explained to the jury, said that the meaning was plain and that
he could not further clarify it. The particular question as to
the meaning of the word "directly" was not asked. On return-
ing to the jury room, the discussion was resumed, with the line
up of 7 to 5 on the issue of contributory negligence still being
maintained. Just before adjournment time it was agreed that
plaintiff should recover for the actual damage to his car, with
nothing for his personal injuries and other damages, because of
his own carelessness.
When we make the doctrinaire statement that the principle
of comparative damages does not obtain in Ohio,2 and that
contributory negligence, however slight, will defeat a recovery,
we are talking of the law in the books. Certainly in actual prac-
tice, the plaintiff, who can get by the obstacle of a directed
verdict, stands a good chance of getting a verdict in spite of his
contributory negligence, if it is not too gross. In this respect
as in many others an element of common sense and fairness may
creep into the administration of justice because of the inability
of lay jurors to understand concepts which are accepted as simple
and obvious by lawyers. The latter may be too prone to think
of the doctrine of contributory negligence as something funda-
mental and necessary, when as a matter of fact it finds no place
in some systems of law2" and is being changed in many jurisdic-
tions in this country. 29
2
', G.C. 11420-I.
217 45 C.J. 1037. "The doctrine has been expressly repudiated in Illinois,
and except in so far as established by statute, none of the other states have
recognized the doctrine and most of them have expressly repudiated it."
Citing cases from many jurdisdictions including Murphy v. Dayton, 7 O.N.P.
227.
21 Under the Civil Law comparative negligence is recognized. See 45
C.J. 1037. The same is true in Admiralty Law, i C.J. 1327.
2' See 45 C.J. 1038 et seq. In Ohio the doctrine of contributory negli-
gence has been superseded by that of comparative negligence in certain actions
14 LAW JOURNAL- DECEMBER, 1935
An experience of several years in teaching the subject of
negotiable instruments, and observing how difficult it is for
some of its peculiar rules to be understood by second and third
year law students, should have prepared one for the result
in a case involving a promissory note. The plaintiff was suing
as the holder of the note, which had been given by defendant,
without consideration, and as part of a reorganization scheme,
to save a speculative venture in which the defendant had previ-
ously invested money. The plaintiff claimed to be a holder in
due course, without notice of the original transaction, and of the
fact that defendant had not received consideration. The jury
was charged explicitly upon the status of a holder in due course
and his freedom from the defense of lack of consideration."
Within fifteen minutes the jury returned a verdict for defend-
ant, and after a deliberation in which there was no discussion
whatever of the various issues. The sole basis for the decision
for defendant was that he had received nothing for the note,
and it wouldn't be fair to make him pay it. The knowledge or
lack of knowledge in the part of plaintiff was not discussed in
the jury room and was not considered as having any significance.
Here again may be seen the tempering effect of the jury system
upon the cold and sometimes harsh doctrines of the law in the
books which young lawyers are apt to take for granted, as neces-
sarily controlling and decisive.81
by employees against employers, by virtue of G.C. 6245-I; see Tube Co. v.
Prusakicueicz, 15 O.C.C. (N.S.) 2 i; Bartsotn v. Craig, i 21 O.S. 37 1 (1929).
169 N.E. 291. See Mole & Wilson "A Study of Comparative Negligence"
(1932) 17 CORN. L.Q. 333, 604. Campbell "Wisconsin's Comparative Neg-
ligence Law" (1932) 7 Wis. L. REv. z22.
3o G.C. 8x67.
"' Frank "Law and the Modem Mind" supra n. 8, at p. i76. "The jury
are sometimes credited with liberalizing strict law because they ignore instruc-
tions. An often-cited illustration is the refusal of the juries to apply the harsh
fellow-servant rule which the courts evolved. But is it not possible that the
courts failed to abolish the fellow-servant rule by 'judicial legislation' just be-
cause the juries made the abolition unnecessary? In other words, the courts
could maintain their attitude of strictness and 'pass the buck' to the jury. The
jury is an unnecessarily cumbersome agency for the process of nullifying rules.
The courts are adept enough in that process when they can't 'pass the buck.'"
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Some little light was obtained on the question which was
mentioned in the beginning, "What part does insurance play
in the decision of an automobile accident case?" An action was
brought by the widow of a man who was found dying in the
road just below Lancaster. She sued a bus company and the
evidence disclosed that a bus had gone down the road just
before he was found, and that certain passengers on the bus had
heard a thud, and had seen an object lying in the road when
they looked back. Some little sparring over the question of
hinting at insurance, had taken place between counsel early in
the case. Later one of the defendant's witnesses was asked a
question which, when answered, disclosed that a report had
been made to a claim adjuster for an insurance company. De-
fendant's counsel immediately protested and demanded a mis-
trial. The court considered the matter, admonished plaintiff's
counsel, and instructed the jury to disregard any allusion to
insurance in the case. One or two more witnesses were called
for defendant, and after the arguments and the charge were
given, the case went to the jury. A unanimous verdict for
$12,500 was returned.
A new trial was granted on two grounds-first, the court's
belief that there was not sufficient evidence of negligence on
the part of the bus company to sustain the verdict, and second,
because of misconduct of counsel in bringing to the attention of
the jury the fact of defendant's insurance. There were several
very intelligent women on the jury and the foreman was a
prominent business man. We were rather surprised to discover
that the matter of insurance had not been mentioned in the jury
room and that the women jurors at least had caught no sug-
gestion of an insurance company being the real defendant in
the case. Seemingly that which seems to lawyers to be the
plainest indication that an insurance company is involved and
to be the equivalent to a signal to the jury "to soak the de-
fendant" may go entirely unobserved or unabsorbed by a group
of laymen and particularly those not familiar with the insuring
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of cars. As a matter of fact the unanimous verdict against the
defendant in this case was due not to any hint of insurance32 but
entirely or nearly so to the failure of defendant's counsel to put
the bus driver on the stand. The jurors had seen him waiting
in the hall for his turn to testify, and when he was not allowed
to do so, the impression was quite naturally created that what
he might say would be damaging to the defendant. Upon the
second trial he did testify and the jury in that case returned a
verdict for $2000 which was immediately paid by the insurance
company.
In another case the father of a small child, killed in a col-
lision, sued the driver of the other car. The usual questions
concerning insurance were asked by plaintiff's counsel under
the rule of the Pavilonis case. Conflicting stories were presented
by the evidence, and the verdict was for defendant. Several
women jurors told us that they had been guided very largely
by the statements and attitude of an intelligent colored man
who had been on the jury. They told us to be sure to talk with
him as he understood the whole thing very well, and could tell
us just what took place. We were glad of the chance to talk
with him and agreed with the ladies that he seemed to be a
very intelligent, level-headed sort of individual. When we
asked him if the jurors had known that the defendant was
insured, and that the insurance company was defending the suit
he was jarred very noticeably. His exclamation was "Why
didn't they tell us?" The assumptions as to the worldly wisdom
of jurors may or may not be justified.
In a recent case 33 the Court of Appeals of Franklin County
discussed the question of quotient verdicts. A verdict of $5391
had been returned against a taxicab company. A motion for new
trial was filed, one ground of error being misconduct of the jury
in returning a quotient verdict. To support this claim there was
32 It seems probable that if there is a prevalence of "soak the defendant"
attitude on the part of the jury it would vent itself upon a defendant bus com-
pany with little regard to the matter of insurance.
33 Stadium Cab Co. v. Shawd, 36 O.L.R. 456 (193z).
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filed an affidavit of the court reporter that he had found twelve
pieces of paper in the jury room with amounts ranging from
$5oo to $io,ooo on each. Affidavits of two jurors were also
filed in which it was stated that the jurors had agreed to place
amounts on ballots, and the quotient of the total divided by
12 was to be the verdict. The court of appeals in its opinion
states that "it is evident that if the affidavit of the jurors repre-
sents what was done by the jury in reaching the verdict which it
returned, and if it was competent and proper evidence to be
offered on the motion for a new trial, the verdict is a quotient
verdict, recognized as illegal because of chance and it must be
set aside." The court then found that the ballots themselves
did not tend to show a quotient verdict, and affirmed the judg-
ment based upon the verdict. The fact that the claim was made
and that the court saw fit to use the language which it did in
condemning quotient verdicts is further support of the sugges-
tion made earlier that law in the books and law in the jury
room bear slight resemblance one to the other.
In many if not in most of the cases which were followed in
this study the amount of the verdict was determined by ballot-
ing and obtaining a quotient. In the books it makes all the dif-
ference in the world whether the jurors go through a certain
mumbo-jumbo before they ballot, to the effect that the quotient
will be the verdict. It is submitted that there is nothing so
obviously wicked or outrageous about such a course of proced-
ure, that any group of laymen ought to realize the illegality of
it, and shun it as the work of the devil. It is extremely rare for
a court in the charge to call attention to the illegality of the
practice. And yet in most jurisdictions the law is settled that
where a quotient verdict has been returned a new trial must be
granted.' Is it not a serious reflection on the efficiency of the
administration of justice that there is always the possibility of
a verdict being set aside and the entire jury trial being held for
naught, because laymen were not familiar with a fine distinction
34 See annotation "Quotient Verdicts" z A.L.R. 41.
18 LAW JOURNAL -DECEMBER, 1935
concocted by lawyers, but kept jealously secret until it can be
brought out to nullify the work of the jury?
There were a great many other features of jury trials which
were seen in a new perspective as a result of getting the jurors'
reaction to them. In one case interrogatories were attached to
the petition," and the refusal of the officers of the defendant
company to unequivocally answer those questions had a ma-
terial bearing on the large verdict rendered against it."
In another bus case the over-willingness of certain pas-
sengers to testify favorably to the defendant company had much
to do with the adverse verdict. A little too much zeal on the
part of one who is supposed to be merely a disinterested witness
may become a dangerous thing.
The lack of attention given to exhibits, such as X-ray pic-
tures, 7 and to the written instructions and pleadings which go
to the jury room was surprising. 8 One case developed a feature
of jury trial that may or may not be rather common. This case
was bitterly contested and the trial consumed more than a week
and resulted in a disagreement. One of the jurors, an excep-
tionally intelligent woman, was quite incensed that three of the
jurors were so much influenced by something other than the
evidence presented. She said that these three insisted upon
having Divine guidance before making a single decision, and
having obtained it, no amount of persuasion or reasoning could
3 5 G.C. I 1348.
36Two corporations organized under the laws of different states had
similar names and were closely affiliated in business. The truck of one of them
was alleged to have collided with plaintiff's automobile. The interrogatories
were intended to clear up the doubt as to whether the truck in the collision
was that of defendant or of the other company. Each of three questions was
answered "We don't know." Counsel for plaintiff made capital of the evasive-
ness in his argument to the jury.
37 In one case, doctors who had testified for the opposing parties had
disagreed as to the meaning of certain shadows on an X-ray picture. It de-
veloped that although the picture had gone to the jury room no attention had
been given to it. The jurors expressed the belief that if the doctors could not
agree as to what the picture meant it was a waste of time for laymen to study it.
38 Perhaps it is not so surprising when one recalls the horror which the
layman has of legal terminology.
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have the slightest effect. It may be that she was mistaken in
so characterizing these individuals. In any event it is remark-
able that, in a civil action with nothing more vital at stake than
a few hundreds of dollars, an attitude of that sort should be
found in the jury room.
If space and the reader's patience permitted, other features
of this study could be recounted. Perhaps enough has been
said to indicate the writer's belief that the law in the books has
enjoyed too much of a monopoly of the attention of those pur-
suing a legal education. The study just described was crude
and amateurish in many respects and cannot be regarded as
anything more pretentious than a starter. It is believed, how-
ever, that if other studies of somewhat similar character could
be made, much useful knowledge concerning the actual admin-
istration of justice might result. If no other result is to come,
it has at least aroused in two law teachers a new interest in that
old, and yet new field, the law of the jury room.
